Wednesday, June 23, 2010
Ashraf Jehangir Qazi
Balochistan, Mea Culpa! We are to blame. We are so sorry. We agree with your every complaint. We intend to make amends. Please take note of our awards, packages, amendments and initiatives. Won't you at least be appreciative and put your faith in our good intentions? Can't you see, if not feel, the pained conscience of our liberal elite over your plight?
Well, if more than 60 years of alienation and exploitation can be washed away so easily it would be very convenient indeed. But Balochistan is not just a major issue in itself; it also represents the cumulative consequence for a country of deliberate and exploitative neglect, stupid self-serving governance, and the arrogant and ignorant use of force, under civilian and military rule, for six decades.
The alienation of the Baloch is just the most salient consequence of the systematic betrayal of the people of Pakistan. Placating them is not just a matter of striking sympathetic and soothing postures, it requires altering the governing context for the country as a whole – something that the ruling elite, not surprisingly, finds unacceptably inconvenient. They are the problem that has to be resolved for any answers to a whole range of specific issues, including Balochistan, to become available.
The ruling elite believes that demonizing Baloch leaders – especially if they resist its blandishments - and trying to recruit more Baloch into its ranks, including the military, can address the problem. This does not represent just arrogance and ignorance; it represents an attitude that sees the Baloch problem as something they can live with, because it can be contained even if never resolved. The Baloch are few in number. The people of the other provinces have their own problems and little contact with the Baloch who, by and large, live beyond the Indus Valley. Iran fears Baloch nationalism even more than Pakistan. Afghanistan has few links with and therefore little sympathy for the Baloch. India may try to leverage the situation to pressure Pakistan but is in no position to effectively assist the Baloch. The US may wish to use the Baloch against Iran but not, as yet, against Pakistan. Like the Kurds, the Baloch have no strategic friends. They can be suppressed at affordable cost – paid for by their own resources.
Moreover, the indigenous people of Balochistan are not one. There are the Baloch, the Brahwi, and the Pashtun. The latter do not identify with the Baloch nationalist cause. The Brahwi have a much more complicated relationship with the Baloch who consider the Brahwi as part of themselves. The Brahwi see themselves as acculturated and politically affiliated to the Baloch but with a distinct identity and language of their own. The Khan of Kalat and some tribes and sub-tribes are considered both Baloch and Brahwi. In recent years, religion and religious parties have come to play a more significant role among the Brahwi than among the Baloch. Nationalist Baloch in an effort to maximize political support claim to speak three languages: Balochi, Brahwi and Seraiki. The Brahwi only claim to speak their own language: Brahwi. Nevertheless, all said and done, the Brahwi are sympathetic to the Baloch nationalist movement and many of them play an active role in it. After all, the areas where neither the Pakistani flag is flown nor the national anthem is sung include Brahwi-inhabited areas.
What about the Baloch sardars? One often hears that the Baloch movement is only a stunt by the sardars to keep their medieval privileges over their own people safe from the modernizing influences of Pakistan. Alternately, and somewhat contradictorily, one hears that of the 70 or so Baloch sardars only three or four are associated with the Baloch national movement and the rest are patriotic Pakistanis. The truth is more complicated. The Baloch sense of grievance is not confined to nationalist sardars. It is shared by the whole Baloch intelligentsia. The sardars of irrigated areas are dependent on the good will of the local administration and have traditionally suffered from the raids of the more independent Baloch hill tribes. Accordingly, they have sought administrative protection against them, and continue this pattern of seeking official patronage today. But they do not wield any influence among the Baloch intelligentsia of today, including students, teachers, lawyers, professionals, etc. who collectively shape Baloch political opinion.
How does this Baloch intelligentsia view Baloch sardars? They make a distinction. They have, by and large, no sympathy for the pro-establishment sardars. As for the nationalist sardars, whatever reservations they may have with regard to their contemporary social relevance, they regard them as essential assets and symbols in their political struggle against the exploitation of the ruling elite of Pakistan – who are seen to be concentrated in the military and from Punjab. Accordingly, they support the nationalist sardars wholeheartedly, particularly the elder generation who led the fourth Baloch rebellion or freedom struggle against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and later, in their declining years, the fifth struggle against General Musharraf which continues today. It is true neither Bhutto nor Musharraf were Punjabis. But they were seen to be backed by Panjab-based institutions and priorities.
It is this perception that has led to the tragic phenomenon of targeted assassinations of "non-locals" who have lived for generations in Balochistan which they consider their home and have served admirably. Their loss would be disastrous for Balochistan. The Baloch intelligentsia, however, will not allow anyone to drive a wedge between them and the nationalist sardars, even though it is possible that they feel that when they achieve their nationalist goals the role of all sardars and tumandars would have to be superseded by contemporary democratic and development imperatives. Moreover, they are convinced an independent Balochistan would be economically viable.
What about the Pashtun of Balochistan? They have less grievances than the Baloch. But they are the "invisible people" of Balochistan. They feel politically ignored and taken for granted. So many informed people, including those in government positions in the rest of Pakistan, regard them as settlers from Afghanistan or Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. In fact they are indigenous people who used to belong to the Kandahar province of Afghanistan before the British detached and included them and their areas in British Balochistan. They are happy to be Pakistanis but have grievances with regard to their situation in what they see as a Baloch dominated administration. The potential flash point between the Baloch and the Pashtun could be the city of Quetta. The Khans of Kalat used to own Quetta. But it was gifted to them by Ahmad Shah Abdali of Afghanistan. The current Baloch aspiration for an independent country would certainly include Quetta as its likely capital. The Pashtun, however, regard themselves and the Brahwi as the indigenous inhabitants of the Quetta region, and would not accept inclusion in an independent Balochistan, or the loss of Quetta to it.
These are possible future scenarios. But they could be made real by the continued mishandling of the situation in Balochistan which, as stated, is integrally related to misrule in Pakistan. By and large, despite local rivalries and complaints about allocation of state resources including government jobs, the Baloch/Brahwi and the Pashtun co-exist amicably. The Pashtun of Balochistan accept their identity as Balochistanis. While they have a strong feeling of solidarity with the Pakhtun of KP (and of Afghanistan) there is no desire among them to be included in KP or ruled from Peshawar, which is considered too far, and from where they would be considered as a marginal people. Moreover, their economy depends on the resources of Balochistan which are largely located in Baloch areas as is their access to the coastal areas of the country. Accordingly, a policy of relying on the Pashtun and non-locals as a counter to Baloch grievance-based aspirations would be disastrous for the whole province and, indeed, the whole country.
This is the essence of the situation in Balochistan which needs to be considered by every concerned Pakistani. What are the solutions? Without accepting these realities there are none. If we do, they will be possible if not easy. It is our choice.
The writer is Pakistan's former envoy to the US and India. Email: ashrafjqazi@yahoo.com
http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=246585
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