EDITORIAL: Comparing Balochistan with Aceh
President Pervez Musharraf has just concluded a trip to Quetta. While there, he made a significant statement when he said that many “foreign hands” including India were to blame for the unrest in Balochistan: “I am one thousand per cent sure that the elements involved in target killings and subversive activities are being financed and trained by foreign elements who do not want peace in the country”. Pointedly, though, the elected chief minister of the province, Nawab Aslam Raisani, was not present when President Musharraf made this remark. Mr Raisani and some of his cabinet members had absented themselves from the governor’s luncheon in protest against President Musharraf’s policies towards Balochistan.
As if in response, the former Senator from Balochistan, Mr Sanaullah Baloch, who resigned from the Senate in despair of ever getting Islamabad to pay attention to the grievances of his province, referred, in an article on Tuesday in an English daily, to the autonomy granted by Indonesia to Aceh in 2005. In this article, Mr Baloch compared the demand for Aceh’s rights to that of Balochistan. He wrote: “The Indonesian government agreed to cede power to the Aceh authorities in all public sectors, except in the fields of foreign affairs, external defence, national security, and monetary and fiscal matters”. What followed was Jakarta’s agreement to “withdraw its economic control and allow Aceh to raise funds from external donors, and set interest rates, raise taxes to finance internal expenditures and conduct trade and business”.
Apparently, then, this encompasses the sum total of rights which the Baloch nationalists are demanding from the Centre, although there is an extreme fringe demanding independence too. According to Mr Baloch, the PMLQ government had advanced towards an initial agreement with Balochistan as a result of negotiations with a Senate Committee. The Senate Committee concluded its talks with the political parties in Balochistan in 2004 but its recommendations were set aside by President Musharraf. According to Mr Baloch the following was agreed: “(a) governance of Balochistan should include the Baloch people’s right to self-rule, ownership of resources, political participation and control over the economy; and (b) security arrangements should include control over civil and armed forces and the police”. He says the Senate Committee was put off that the president’s “military mind” had shelved its report.
The comparison with Aceh is understandable. The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was on for decades but the Indonesian state, ruled by military men, had reacted most aggressively against it. Compared to what the government did in East Timor, a region grabbed by Indonesia against the opinion of the United Nations, Aceh was an area of lower insurgency. But what should be critically noted is this: Indonesia, a state comprising hundreds of islands, had to collapse in 1999 for East Timor to get its freedom in 2002 and Aceh to get its autonomy in 2005.
One can say that Pakistan is in disarray today but it has not reached the state of Indonesian collapse in 1999. Eventually, the UN Security Council moved and sent in a team of diplomats — headed by Pakistan’s Jamsheed Marker — to get Jakarta to let go of East Timor. Before that, Indonesia’s big strategic partners, the United States and Australia, had signalled that they were no longer interested in keeping Indonesia intact. Three years after East Timor joined the UN as its 190th member, Aceh too was allowed to become autonomous.
It would be extremely perverse to tell Mr Baloch that he may have to wait till the state of Pakistan collapses as completely as Indonesia did in 1999 before Balochistan becomes another Aceh. One should instead tell Islamabad that it should fairly deal with the question of provincial autonomy while the federation is still able to negotiate with the provinces. When the Acehnese finally staged their successful insurgency the Indonesian state was hardly in a position to negotiate. Today, with democracy freer in its capacity to confer with the provinces, it is time to sit down and decide the matter on which a consensus in principle already exists.
Mr Baloch should surely be the representative of Balochistan when the provinces sit down with the centre to discuss autonomy. Also present should be the Baloch representing maximalist and minimalist positions, so that the “strong on the ground” elements don’t intimidate those in political power. Of course the final quantum of autonomy would be based on what the provinces would agree to take from the Centre. Most Pakistanis are favourably inclined to grant a lot more autonomy to the provinces than is now granted in the Constitution.
But any kind of extremism will hamper a consensus among the provinces. They must first look sympathetically at Balochistan’s demand to redesign the NFC award in such a way that Balochistan and the NWFP get special concessions. Since autonomy will require the reduction of the centralised state, the provinces will also have to decide where to put the limits of this reduction so as not to completely hamstring the federation. The provinces will also have to consider carefully their own multiethnic nature. The rights of one ethnicity should not curtail the rights of another. *
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