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By: Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi
No enduring solution of the Balochistan problem is possible unless the federal government decides to trim its role in the polity. Quetta should be the focal point of decision-making on and management of major projects for socio-economic development. This cannot happen as long as the â?~unity of commandâ?T remains the guiding principle of governance and political management
The trouble in the Sui area of Balochistan in the first two weeks of January appears to have shaken the politically active groups and people throughout the country. The media gave a detailed coverage to different aspects of the problem and presented the perspectives of the government, Baloch political leaders of all persuasions including the Bugti chieftain, and Pakistanâ?Ts major political parties. All the newspapers published editorials and articles on the Balochistan situation.
Despite the divergence of views expressed through the media, there was a near unanimity on three points. First, the federal government should not resort to military operation in any part of Balochistan. Nobody wanted a replay of the 1973-77 military action. Second, the media and political leaders advised the federal government and the Baloch regional-nationalist leaders, especially the Bugti tribal elders, to show restraint and settle the matter through dialogue and accommodation. Third, the Baloch leaders should restrain the hardliners and not allow them to damage important installations like the natural gas plant. Such incidents weaken the support for the Baloch cause in other provinces.
The on-going debate on Balochistan has highlighted seven major causes of the problem. First, the sardari system is the principal reason for under-development in Balochistan. The sardars are opposed to any economic or political change that weakens their hold on their people. Some of the sardars may not oppose development per se but they want to control its management and direction to reinforce their control of the area and the people.
Second, those opposing the government get material assistance from abroad, including Pakistanâ?Ts adversaries or those having a strong interest in the region. Some have argued that weapons used by the hardliners in Balochistan were smuggled from Afghanistan though tribal connections or though the smuggling underworld.
Third, some of the political leaders play up narrow local or regional issues in order to sustain their leadership. They may have no sympathy for the ordinary people but project themselves as the champions of local and provincial interests.
Fourth, some people with a negative disposition are opposed to the economic development projects launched by the federal government. They are unable or unwilling to recognise that these efforts would in due course of time transform the poverty landscape of the province.
Fifth, the efforts to transform an under-developed society always face opposition in the initial stages. Some people are opposed to change anyway. Others are afraid of the socio-cultural changes caused by modernisation and economic development. However, the opposition subsides when the people start benefiting from economic development and modernisation.
Sixth, some people with a criminal mentality are always out to incite trouble in a conflict or uncertain situation. This allows them to further their anti-social agendas.
The last major explanation emphasises the absence of participatory institutions and processes that could accommodate the aspirant political and other elite to enter the provincial and national mainstream. The denial of provincial rights and autonomy has created a strong sense of alienation in the politically-active circles in Balochistan. While some of these elements pursue a moderate approach, others adopt a hard line, including the use of violence. However, the people with both the approaches are averse to today the existing state of affairs in the province and favour changes for ensuring increased political participation and socio-economic justice.
Elements of these interpretations may be found in the multi-dimensional Balochistan problem. No single interpretation amounts to a comprehensive and satisfactory explanation and some may be less credible. The sardari system may be an obstacle to development but this does not necessarily mean that its abolition alone will usher in an era of progress in Balochistan. Similarly, there may actually be people with narrow political perspectives, a negative disposition towards development or pursuing anti-social agendas.
The presence of such elements in a society does not necessarily mean that they will take on the state and the government and create a security situation like the one that exists in parts of Balochistan. People of different persuasions learn to work together against the backdrop of their experience which determines their political profile as well as their mode of interaction with the state and the government. If there is a perception over time that the state institutions and the governmental processes work to their disadvantage and they are not in a position to modify their dynamics, they get alienated. As the alienation intensifies, they start making extremist demands and adopt a tough disposition in support of their demands. People with different backgrounds and agendas start working together under the umbrella of a political movement for their identity, rights and interests.
Balochistan was one of the backward regions of British India. Its position did not change much after independence. While it got the status of a full province in July 1970, it remained under the firm control of the federal government which played a decisive role in deciding who ruled this province. The military rule (Yahya and Zia) and authoritarian rule by ZA Bhutto caused much alienation there. The only time political tempers were somewhat defused was the period of civilian rule (1988-1999). The return of military rule under General Pervez Musharraf revived the operationally unitary and centralised rule over Balochistan. This was coupled with a number of structural problems that accentuated poverty and underdevelopment in Balochistan. These problems include large territory and small-and-scattered population that lacks basic facilities of life. The archaic tribal system resisted changes initiated by any outside authority, perpetuating the status quo.
The political and social aspirants that emerged in Balochistan in the late 1960s and the 1970s could not be accommodated in the political process. Had the democratic process been functioning normally, they could move up in the political ladder by virtue of their local standing. However, this did not happen because recruitment to the positions of power and influence was controlled by the military-bureaucratic elite. The only channel open to the new aspirants was co-option by the military-bureaucratic establishment (especially the military) on the condition of working in harmony with it. A large section of the Baloch elite refused to be co-opted and demanded democratisation and transparency in recruitment to the positions of power and influence. They also demanded that the provinces should enjoy more autonomy to run their own affairs.
An amicable management of the Balochistan problems calls for wide-ranging changes in the existing system of governance and political management from Islamabad. The provinces should be given more financial, administrative and political autonomy in operational terms. No enduring solution of the Balochistan problem is possible unless the federal government decides to trim its role in the polity. Major concerns of the Baloch leaders about the on-going mega projects should be accommodated even if this requires some changes in these projects. Representative character of the present system should be strengthened by reducing the role of the military.
The consultations on the Balochistan-related issues should involve the representatives and the societal groups. Quetta should be the focal point of decision-making on and management of the major projects for socio-economic development. This cannot happen as long as the â?~unity of commandâ?T remains the guiding principle of governance and political management.
Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst
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