By NAYAN CHANDA
Published: April 11, 2005
EW HAVEN
FIVE hundred and ninety years after a Chinese fleet cast anchor at Hormuz, the Chinese are back in the Arabian Sea. When Prime Minister Wen Jiabao of China visited Pakistan last week, one of the many deals he signed was for the deepening of the port at Gwadar, whose Chinese-built facilities symbolize China’s return to an area that was, briefly, a playground for its navy.
The port’s just completed first phase - three berths that can accommodate very large ships - is relatively insignificant. But its projected size and strategic location have sent ripples of anxiety through Washington, Tokyo and New Delhi about the potential establishment of a permanent Chinese naval presence near the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40 percent of the world’s oil passes.
For the sake of regional stability, Beijing should forgo any ambitions to use Gwadar for its naval vessels. Yet China has valid reasons to help develop a commercial port that other powers must accept. Its return to the Indian Ocean is the logical outcome of its blazing economic growth, which the West has encouraged, applauded and profited from. A China that depends increasingly on imported oil transported great distances can justifiably seek commercial refueling and repair facilities, just as European powers dependent on far-flung coaling stations for their ships did in the 19th century.
For a brief time in the 15th century, China had the means, but no deep-rooted rationale, for overseas expansion. The Middle Kingdom’s maritime glory can be traced to the personal enthusiasm of a single ruler, the Ming emperor Yongle, who dispatched 63 vessels to the Indian Ocean in seven waves. China’s first and thus far only blue-water navy consisted of multimasted ships weighing 1,500 tons - Vasco da Gama’s weighed only 300 tons - and carried 27,500 men up to the Persian Gulf and Africa’s eastern shore.
Aside from battling pirates and pretenders to the throne, the fleet served primarily as a propaganda vehicle for the emperor. Chinese sailors dazzled Asian states with their technological and military prowess, transported barbarian envoys willing to pay tribute to the Son of Heaven, and brought home exotic products, from aphrodisiac rhinoceros horns to live giraffes. But the expeditions ended as suddenly as they had begun. By the time the Portuguese Navy appeared in the Indian Ocean in 1497, the Chinese had already gone home.
This time, China’s thirst for energy is dictating its turn to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Since 1993 China has been a net oil importer; as its need has grown to 40 percent of total consumption, so has its dependence on oil from the Middle East. Eighty percent of China’s oil imports pass through the Malacca Straits, the closing of which would wreak havoc upon the Chinese economy. To reduce this dependence, China has been working to build alternative supply routes through Myanmar to the south and Pakistan to the west. A road, and eventually a pipeline, from Gwadar could give China an alternative energy route that it urgently needs and spur the development of its westernmost provinces. Hence its plan to provide more than a billion dollars in aid and loan guarantees for building at Gwadar.
China’s search for energy security also dovetails, however, with its long-term strategic effort to expand its regional influence and box in India. Analysts see Chinese-operated listening posts in Myanmar’s Coco Islands, China’s support for a port near Yangon for handling 10,000-ton ships (of which the Burmese have only a few) and another deep-water port at Kyaukpyu in western Myanmar, Chinese aid to the Bangladeshi port of Chittagong and plans to improve Cambodia’s Sihanoukville as part of an incremental effort to build a "string of pearls" presence on the Indian Ocean rim.
Many believe it is only a matter of time before the Chinese Navy, much strengthened by recent purchases of ships and technology, arrives in Gwadar. Pakistani officials boast that Gwadar’s Chinese connection will help to frustrate India’s domination of regional waterways. A Chinese maritime presence in the area would enable the mainland to monitor naval patrols by the United States and protect Chinese sea lines of communication. China Economic Net, an online news outlet sponsored by China’s leading business paper, calls Gwadar "China’s biggest harvest."
The fact remains, however, that with the exception of the Chinese "fishing trawlers" occasionally found mapping the ocean floor (information needed by submarines), the Chinese Navy has yet to show up. So for now, instead of raining on China’s parade at Gwadar, India and the United States should welcome China’s contribution to expanded maritime commerce and the additional sense of security that Beijing might derive from it. The port at Gwadar will be a boon to the regional economy; and to deny China’s need for a secure oil supply while pumping billions of dollars into China to produce more gas-guzzling cars is both illogical and, in an indirect but palpable way, hostile. China should be left in no doubt, however, that using the Gwadar port for its military would increase tensions and weaken the energy security that it ostensibly seeks. Checking its frigates and submarines at the door would be a good way for China to ensure that others are also able to enjoy the party.
Nayan Chanda, a former editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review, isthe editor of YaleGlobal Online.
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