By: Rashed Rahman
The Pararis (rebels) maintained their guerrilla forces intact and continued to expand their reach, influence and numbers after the 1969 ceasefire. In certain areas, they were able to run a virtual parallel government. Despite their acceptance of a ceasefire, the Pararis were convinced a renewal of hostilities with Islamabad was only a matter of time.
The uneasy truce lasted until 1973, when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, after a series of Centrally-backed provocations, toppled the elected government of Sardar Ataullah Mengal in February 1973 and launched a major military operation against the Baloch people (See Philip Jones: "Center-Province Relations in Pakistan: The Case of Bhutto and the Regionalists", Paper presented at the 32nd Annual Convention of the Association for Asian Studies, Washington, 1980. For the government’s view of the events leading up to the outbreak of hostilities in 1973, see White Paper on Baluchistan, Government of Pakistan, Rawalpindi, 1974, and before the Supreme Court, Government’s reference on NAP’s Dissolution, Government of Pakistan, Rawalpindi, 1975). By August 1973, a full-scale guerrilla war was in progress when Bhutto jailed the Baloch leadership consisting of Khair Bux Marri, Attaullah Mengal and Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, along with thousands of political cadres and activists all over the country.
Four divisions of regular troops were deployed against the guerrillas, but failed to match their commitment, speed, mobility, familiarity with the terrain and support of the people. Bhutto then obtained military and financial aid from the Shah of Iran, including helicopter gunships which the Pakistan army did not possess at that time. Some of these helicopter gunships were piloted by Iranians, and their empty bullet casings captured in the fighting clearly showed Iranian markings. Largely unnoticed in the rest of Pakistan or the world at large because of a complete news blackout imposed by the Bhutto regime, the struggle grew in ferocity over the next four years. The fighting was more widespread and intense than it had been during the conflicts of the 1950s and 60s and impacted on most of the Baloch population at one time or another.
By July 1974, the guerrillas had been able to cut off most of the main roads and disrupt the Sibi-Harnai railroad, blocking coal shipments to Punjab. Attacks on drilling and survey operations effectively halted exploration by Pakistani and American oil companies (See Selig S. Harrison: In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1981, pp. 46-47). Army casualties began to mount as the effectiveness of ambushes and raids on military camps increased. At this stage, the air force and helicopters were brought into the battle.
An army ground and air offensive in the winter of 1974 on the Baloch tribes, largely Marris, along with their families, gathered in an annual pilgrimage to the Chamalang plains to graze their flocks, inflicted heavy human and livestock casualties, forcing people to flee to Afghanistan and other provinces in Pakistan along with their families. After this battle, Bhutto declared that the back of the insurgency had been broken.
But contrary to Bhutto’s claim, the Pararis evolved during the fighting over five years into the Balochistan People’s Liberation Front (BPLF). This movement raised the level of scientific guerrilla warfare in the Baloch resistance to new heights, inflicting over 3,500 dead and 6,500 wounded on the military by 1977 (See the monthly organ of the BPLF, Jabal. For the government’s version, see State, Through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, vs. Abdul Wali Khan and Others, before the Special Court, Hyderabad, 1976. For Western press accounts see "Pakistan’s Civil War", Guardian, January 24, 1975, cand "Baluchistan: The Forgotten War", Le Monde Diplomatique, August 1976). In retaliation for the successful guerrilla resistance, the military cruelly bombed and killed the non-combatant population. Nevertheless, by 1977, when Bhutto was overthrown in a military coup by General Ziaul Haq, the military had virtually been fought to a standstill.
General Zia sued for a ceasefire in return for promises of freeing all political prisoners, especially the Baloch leadership incarcerated and being tried for treason in the Hyderabad Conspiracy Case, and compensation and rehabilitation for the victims of the military’s scorched earth campaigns. Although about 6,000 prisoners did walk free, albeit bearing the scars of the cruel tortures inflicted on them during incarceration, and the Hyderabad Conspiracy case was withdrawn, the rest of Zia’s promises constituted one more "broken treaty". The victims of the military’s cruelty were left to fend for themselves, including those who returned home to a ruined existence under the general amnesty declared by the Zia regime.
The Baloch nationalist movement was radicalized by five years of guerrilla warfare. The BPLF introduced revolutionary ideas into the movement that transcended family, clan, sectional and tribal loyalties and saw the Baloch nationalist struggle as part of national liberation struggles in the third world. The BPLF manifesto stressed that it was "not fighting a secessionist war for the Baluch alone, but a war of national liberation for all the nationalities of Pakistan" (See Strategy for Liberation: The War in Baluchistan, Baluchistan People’s Liberation Front, Paris, 1976). The BPLF stressed its commitment to a Pakistan-wide revolution by describing Balochistan as "a reliable base area for the liberation struggles of other oppressed nationalities, classes and democratic forces in Pakistan" (See Jabal, December 1976).
Unfortunately, the accumulated problems of the people who had suffered the worst of the military’s excesses, and internal differences in the movement caused a political implosion after the ceasefire in the otherwise militarily undefeated movement. That has led, in the 27 years that have passed since, in a regression into pure nationalism, for which the major part of the blame must be put on the shoulders of successive Central governments who have neglected Balochistan’s complaints, failed to redress past wrongdoings, and turned a blind eye to the province’s real development needs.
During this interregnum, the tendency in the Baloch nationalist movement that criticized the armed struggle of 1973-77 and argued for engagement with the mainstream political process achieved ascendancy amongst Baloch public opinion. But this ’engagement’ yielded only corruption by many of the erstwhile respected nationalist leaders and failed to bring about any change in the lives of the ordinary Baloch. The disillusionment and alienation of Baloch youth from this false promise of mainstream politics can be directly traced as the foundation for the current armed struggle undertaken under the banner of the Baloch Liberation Army. This guerrilla force has been conducting operations since 2003, hitting infrastructure and paralyzing the ability of the Central authorities to take advantage of Balochistan’s rich mineral resources for the benefit not of the people of Balochistan, but outsiders.
All the much touted mega projects being launched in Balochistan by the Musharraf regime, including Gwadar, do not envisage any participation of or benefit for the local people. They are intended solely to serve the interests of the ruling elite and state institutions. The incident of the rape of a lady doctor in Sui, allegedly by a military officer belonging to the Defence Security Guards (DSG) at the Sui gas plant evoked a violent reaction from local people when it became obvious that the authorities were attempting a cover-up and protecting the accused. While the alleged perpetrators walk free, the unfortunate lady doctor and her husband were spirited away out of the country, presumably to spare the government further blushes at its shameful role of protector of the rapists. The earlier clashes in Sui have been sought to be ’avenged’ by the FC and regular troops by attacking Dera Bugti, the abode of Akbar Khan Bugti. His house was targeted by rockets and mortars, whose indiscriminate use led to the deaths of 62 people, 32 of them Hindus killed in a temple, including women and children.
The regime has made much of lip service to resolving the current tense stand-off in Bugti area and the long standing complaints of deprivation of the people of Balochistan by peaceful means. But the provocative and unprovoked attacks of the security forces on the Bugtis have soured the chances of a peaceful resolution. Nevertheless, despite a stop-go process of negotiations with Akbar Bugti, Chaudry Shujaat and his parliamentary committee, with its three sub-committees doing the detailed groundwork, have succeeded to the extent at least of bringing about a ceasefire and a plan for the withdrawal of military and paramilitary forces on the one hand and the armed Bugtis confronting them on the other, with compensation for the families of those killed, as the first step towards a discussion on the packages the parliamentary committees have framed.
(to be continued) The writer is the Executive Editor of The Post
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