Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi
A dialogue should be initiated with the political leaders in Balochistan on contentious issues like mega development projects, construction of army cantonments and greater provincial autonomy. However, dialogue may not be possible until the military confrontation in the province is defused. Moreover, the provincial government and army/intelligence personnel are not suitable for conducting such a dialogue
The federal government can temporarily rely on the state’s coercive apparatus for asserting its authority in the troubled areas of Balochistan. However, this method is not expected to produce an enduring solution to the problem. Rather, the longer the present armed conflict continues the more difficult it will for the two sides - the federal government and the dissident elements - to reach a negotiated settlement.
The root causes of the Balochistan problem are political and economic and pre-date the Musharraf regime. Federal governments often neglected the province and failed to address its problems. When General Pervez Musharraf assumed power in October 1999, he promised to, among other things, work towards "strengthening the federation, removing inter-provincial disharmony and restoring national cohesion".
Six years later, the promise remains unfulfilled. The federal government is using regular troops and paramilitary forces in parts of Balochistan and South and North Waziristan, adjacent to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, supposedly for "strengthening the federation". On top of these developments President Pervez Musharraf’s advocacy of the Kalabagh Dam has caused resentment in Sindh and the NWFP. Balochistan also opposes the dam. These developments have seriously strained centre-province relations and undermined inter-provincial interaction.
The situation in Balochistan did not deteriorate in a day. The first sign of trouble was visible when the federal government unilaterally decided to launch mega development projects and build new army cantonments in the province without taking into account local and provincial sensitivities. Local objections to the federal projects were ignored or dealt with, with a military mindset.
The federal government was so convinced of the righteousness of its development agenda that it brushed aside the objections raised by several political leaders as excuses for protecting vested interests. It applied the military ethos of unity of command and centralisation to directly manage development in Balochistan. The federal government co-opted a section of the political elite in the province that supported the federal agenda. At the same time, it excluded those who questioned the government policies.
The narrow and selective ’consensus’ was designed to prove that federal policies enjoyed support in the province and that only isolated and self-centred political activists and tribal leaders were opposed to the development work.
The co-opted elite in Balochistan (the ruling Pakistan Muslim League (PML) and the provincial government) failed to neutralise opposition to the development work for two major reasons. First, the provincial government had little, if any, role in the planning and management of the new development projects. They felt awkward defending the policies handed down by Islamabad, which did not address local concerns and anxieties. The provincial government could not assuage these anxieties because it did not have control over the projects.
Second, the financial problems of the provincial government convinced many in the ruling PML that the province must have financial and administrative autonomy to generate more resources and pursue a more participatory approach for addressing poverty and underdevelopment. They quietly agreed with the issues raised by the opposition but disagreed with their strategies. This state of mind weakened the role of the co-opted leaders.
The policy of excluding the dissenting leaders caused strains in provincial politics. They raised these issues in the provincial assembly and the parliament as well as the media. But, the federal government remained inflexible about accommodating local concerns over the mega development projects, although it offered economic assistance to the provincial government to sustain itself and pursue some development work.
It ignored the demands for protecting Baloch interests in the development projects and granting autonomy to the province so that it should have greater control of its natural resources.
Having lost faith in the ability of the existing political arrangements, the dissenting hardliners drifted towards violence, targeting the symbols of state authority. The security situation deteriorated gradually with bomb blasts and rocket firing incidents and periodic damage to the telephone network, electricity transmission lines and gas pipelines.
At times, bombs were placed at crowded spots in cities, causing loss of life and property. Such incidents began in 2003 and their frequency increased in late 2004 and the first six months of 2005.
The January 2005 trouble in the Sui area was the first major conflict between the tribal elements and the law enforcement authorities. The parliamentary committee on Balochistan became active and Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and Mushahid Hussain approached Nawab Akbar Bugti to defuse the situation. This engendered the hope that a durable solution would be evolved through political means.
The sub-committee headed by Mushahid Hussain suggested various options. However, the federal government has not so far implemented its recommendations. This has created the impression that the federal government is not serious about political accommodation.
The latest phase of violence has taken a serious turn because the military operation has been extended beyond the Kohlu area where incidents in mid-December 2005 triggered the on-going military action. Though official circles are emphasising that military action is limited to the dissidents’ camps and the tribesmen attacking government installations or the troops, non-official and independent sources talk of its brutal impact on the ordinary people who have been forced to migrate to other areas. Some information on military operations provided by the army’s spokesman is not corroborated by independent news sources.
The Balochistan situation cannot be treated as a law and order problem or as trouble ignited by three or four tribal chiefs. Balochistan’s grievances are deep-rooted and require participatory political handling. A large number of people supporting the demands, often described as Baloch nationalists, are not the followers of the tribal chiefs. They are genuinely concerned about the political and economic future of the province and its people. The federal government’s administrative approach has compelled them to work with the tribal chiefs against the centre.
The possibility of extremists’ involvement in the trouble in Balochistan cannot be ruled out but everybody supporting the movement cannot be labelled an extremist or miscreant. Most political activists and tribal chiefs are inclined towards a negotiated settlement.
A genuinely political approach is needed. If this does not happen the conflict in Balochistan may draw in powerful states and trans-national players. This will accentuate Pakistan’s already troubled internal security.
A dialogue should be initiated with the political leaders in Balochistan on contentious issues like mega development projects, construction of army cantonments and greater provincial autonomy. However, dialogue may not be possible until the military confrontation in the province is defused. Moreover, the provincial government and army/intelligence personnel are not suitable for conducting such a dialogue.
Credible civilian political channels should be employed for the dialogue. If and when the agreement is reached the federal government should implement it without delay and be prepared to work with a more autonomous provincial set-up.
Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006 115story_15-1-2006_pg3_2 |
