By M. Abul Fazl
AS the federal governments’ current military operation in Balochistan the fifth since Pakistans birth assumes intensity, the confusion about the main contradictions driving it becomes compounded. It is evident from the fact that while armed tribesmen, under the control of their Sardars, fight the Frontier Corps personnel, Islamabad offers to provide protection to Bugti from the FCs artillery fire. Mr. Bugti insists that there can be no further talks with Islamabad, and the leader of the opposition in the Balochistan Assembly, Kachkol Ali, appreciates the concern expressed by India on the situation in the province.
Meanwhile, the tribesmen are seen using a wide array of weapons least expected to be in private hands to attack FC personnel, state installations, gas pipelines and the railway tracks and now they are making forays into Punjab, too. And the government refuses to use adequate force to control what, in ordinary parlance, would be described as an armed insurrection.
One finds such anomalies in the situation in Balochistan because the principal contradiction there is not between the state and the Baloch tribal Sardars. The federal government, in fact, depends upon the Sardars to maintain law and order in the areas in which their tribes reside an arrangement which also spares it from incurring huge expenditure and the hassle of doing the job itself for the actual cost in that case could turn out to be higher than the subsidies paid to the Sardars. The problems that arise between the government and the tribal elite from time to time are essentially over the amount of rent, royalties and other financial benefits that the Sardars think should accrue to them for use of their land and of mineral and energy resources located in their territory.
The tribal economy in Balochistan is basically pastoral although there is some agriculture and production of handicrafts largely done by the women-folk. But these economic activities are also dominated by the pastoral mode of production.
This mode of production is primitive and is low both in productivity and social surplus. There can, therefore, be no ruling stratum in the tribe. All power rests in the Sardar who combines the appropriation of the surplus with the administration of the tribe in both political and economic terms. In addition, he is a spiritual leader and enjoys a saintly status in his tribe a phenomenon which underpins the tribes men’s dependent relationship with the Sardar.
This makes Balochistan’s tribal society relatively much stable, integrated and cohesive albeit with an equilibrium of a low economic level. It is this enviable social background from which the Sardar enters the national politics as a strong figure. It is also the reason why the Sardar seeks to protect his tribe from any alien influence which may damage the tribal nature of his society and subsequently his own power. The alien influence can find its way into the ancient, peaceful, well-knit tribal society with the advent of roads, education, hospitals, industry, modern communication means, etc.
Here, the interests of the federal government and the tribal leaderships, it is ironic to note, coincide strategically. The differences between them, if at all, are of some tactical nature. The surplus yielded by a pastoral society with its extremely low level of productivity does not suffice to enable the Sardars to perform their traditional functions, for they are unable to maintain a standard of living commensurate with their social positions. The government has, therefore given them lands in Punjab and Sindh, apart from paying the normal subsidies. They are also paid rent for allowing the use of their lands where gas fields are discovered, although it also helps local people as they get employment in such projects.
The clash begins shaping up when the Sardars feel dissatisfied with either the amount of their subsidies or with the royalties paid to them for the exploitation of oil, gas and mineral deposits in their areas. Or when they feel that the government is insensitive to the privileges that they think they deserve.
However, periodic violent clashes are no less a blessing. They give strength to, and prolong the life of, the tribal system as they enable the Sardars to act as a saviour of the members of their tribes and a protector against external violence and alien influence. That the nature of the contradiction between the government and the Sardars is non-antagonistic is evident from the fact that, in spite of an insurrection-like situation, the security forces or troops are careful enough not to lay their hands on the Sardars. The reason owes its origin to the policy of the British Raj, which has been borrowed, adopted and practised by the Pakistan government, under which the latter considers the Sardars the only interlocutor on behalf of the people of their tribes for negotiations and settlement of a dispute. The incumbent provincial regime or other political forces cannot play this role.
The situation in Balochistan can become far more stable if the federal government chooses to interact with the democratic forces, although they are fewer, weaker and lack any popular following. Civil society in Balochistan cannot grow in tandem with its counterparts in other provinces for the Sardars would not let it happen. Besides, the educated middle class and intelligentsia, which are pillars of a civil society, are small. Hence, the political parties, trade unions, human rights groups, etc., cannot grow independently and can only function under the guidance of the tribal Sardars. So, the Sardars also appropriate democratic groups demand for provincial autonomy because it can, in case it is conceded to by Islamabad, further strengthen their power and the tribal system.
The small working class in the province consists of railway workers and some miners. The closure of the ship breaking industry in Somiani has reduced their numbers though they will now grow in size when Gadani port becomes fully functional. The rural wage-workers in the north-east are seasonal and unorganized. In sum, the workers weight is negligible and they are isolated from the middle class.
But only a middle-class, consisting of traders, shopkeepers, artisans and lower-grade office-workers, can, in alliance with workers, become the backbone of a democratic social movement. Until this happens in Balochistan, the government cannot regard this class a worthy stakeholder and hold a dialogue with it along with the tribal Sardars for settlement of disputes.
The students come mainly from this class. They would, therefore, be in sympathy with its political programme. Even otherwise, the students not being related directly to the means of production, an important section among them can act autonomously in relation to the exploiting classes. They have, thus, often been the spearhead of social movements, as was the case in Budapest in 1956 and in Paris in 1968.
Their role has been somewhat similar in Balochistan but not much effective due to the smallness of the democrat’s social base. It is this ineffectiveness and their repeated failure to get their way in politics that has often driven a small section of them to violence. The governments reaction has been inappropriate, resembling the repression in Latin America, which was marked by disappearances. Therefore, the students have retreated from the political arena. I do not know but it is possible that the Balochistan Liberation Army is the creation of some extremist students. Actually, in Balochistan, the end of any political movement of protest is said to be signalled by bomb blasts in towns, which is, of course, a useless act.
However, the democrats can, in alliance with the workers, build themselves into viable interlocutors with the government. This would then effectively reduce the role of the Sardars in politics and give Balochistan a progressive, modern political leadership.
The democrat’s demand of excessive provincial autonomy may be theoretically correct. But it puts them in the company of the landed classes of Sindh and the Frontier, not to speak of their own Sardars, all of them being practitioners of a primitive kind of exploitation. Whenever the left has accepted right-wing leadership in pursuit of a nationalist struggle, it has always been the loser.
Lastly, some great powers are interested in Balochistan, not for the good of the province but for their own interests. The interests of the Baloch and of the imperialists can never coincide. Therefore, a democratic movement in Balochistan can achieve the greatest good of the Baloch only in cooperation with the other forward-looking forces within Pakistan.
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