General Pervez Musharraf has denied that the government is carrying out a military operation in Balochistan or that there has been any collateral damage there. While talking to the media at his Camp Office in Rawalpindi, General Musharraf said that before a political solution can be sought to the problem in Balochistan, the private militia must stop hampering development activities. Presumably, he was referring to the Balochistan Liberation Army, a ragtag outfit whose shadowy spokesmen keep claiming credit for various incidents of violence in that province. General Musharraf also said that the Sardars will have to disarm, that the government will give them no money in the future and that they will have to behave like law-abiding citizens. "We will not let them flourish and challenge the writ of the government ... [which] will be established in Balochistan," General Musharraf said and added that "I do not believe in politics at the cost of the nation ... the nation comes first".
General Musharraf’s statements are important because, reading between the lines, we can try to ascertain what might be happening in Balochistan.
General Musharraf has refuted claims that the army is operating in Balochistan and there have been civilian deaths. He was clearly seeking to deny a report by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan which has alleged "atrocities" by the Pakistan Army. There have also been reports from outside Pakistan that paint a bleak picture of what’s going on in Balochistan and how the situation could get out of hand. A leading report is a January 2006 Carnegie paper by a French diplomat, Frédéric Grare, titled Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baluch [sic] Nationalism. Grare has described the human rights situation as "grave"; he has also rejected the claim by Islamabad that India is fishing in Balochistan.
When General Musharraf says that the army is not operating in Balochistan, he is dissembling. For one, even if we accept that the army is not actively engaged in taking out the insurgents, it is deployed there to ensure that the Frontier Corps is reinforced and its (FC’s) efforts to clean up the area are supplemented. And until recently, gunships were used against some targets. Second, the FC itself is officered by army officers even as it is categorised as a paramilitary or civil armed force. This is a technicality which India also uses every time it is accused of troop concentration in Indian-held Kashmir. Finally, any operation that involves the use of force is a military operation whether it is conducted by the army or paramilitary personnel. General Musharraf’s assertion that so far 14 out of 28 districts have been converted into "A" areas from "B" areas also shows that force has been at work.
General Musharraf has also said that the government will not go for a political solution until the sardars and their militias disarm. We are not sure if this is a good strategy. Israel also wants Hamas to disarm before it will negotiate with Hamas; India wants the Kashmiri fighters to renounce violence before it will talk to them. This conditionality usually does not work. In situations of political unrest accompanied by violence, a better strategy is to combine force with a political dialogue, not withhold a dialogue until everyone has been beaten into submission. The dialogue is supposed to address those grievances that have forced some people to pick up guns. It is, or should be, aimed at making the use of violence irrelevant. The resolve that the government will not politically engage the province until and unless the Baloch surrender smacks of hubris.
General Musharraf is right about the sardars. They have to behave like other citizens of Pakistan. To this end, the government has adopted a strategy of inducting into the province dissenting elements and tribes that had been shunted out by the sardars, especially Nawab Akbar Bugti. But this strategy too can work only in tandem with a political process. General Musharraf’s take on the process has revealed why the Balochistan Committee has become dysfunctional. It would be unfortunate if the good work done by the Shujaat/Mushahid team were allowed to fall by the wayside. As for the subcommittee headed by Senator Wasim Sajjad, which was to look into the issue of provincial autonomy, it seems to have simply vanished. Even as the committee was functioning, its head, former prime minister Ch Shujaat Hussain, said that some quarters were trying to throw a spanner in the committee’s works. It is not difficult to see who those elements might be. Not surprisingly, Mr Hussain has been quiet on Balochistan since the operation started there in the wake of the rocket attack on General Musharraf during a rally in Kohlu.
But the questions tackled by these sub-committees underpin the simmering problem in Balochistan. They need to be tackled, not least because they go beyond the issue of the sardars. General Musharraf’s statement that sardars will not be given any money in the future also reveals the way successive federal governments sought to govern Balochistan by bribing and appeasing the sardars. But the way to do it is not simply to thrust "development" (military cantonments) down the throats of the Baloch. The Baloch need to get ownership of the development that has been denied them by both the federal governments and their own sardars. Development without political expression means nothing.
Musharraf must be reminded that weapons are part of Baloch life and cultural heritage asking Baloch to give their weapons means inviting more troubles.
Baloch will use their weapons to protect their national assets and Baloch freedom in their own lands, no power will be able to take away Baloch freedom, freedom is our dignity for which Baloch will any sacrifices.
Baloch Unity. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006 2 5story_5-2-2006_pg3_1 |
